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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 10-4163 
_____________ 
 
COLGATE- PALMOLIVE COMPANY 
 
v. 
 
TANDEM INDUSTRIES; GYP’S MARKET; JAMES LAWSON; THOMAS 
MULHEARN; RICHARD FLOWER 
 
RICHARD FLOWER, 
      Appellant 
________________ 
        
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
District Court  No. 3-07-cv-01709 
District Judge: The Honorable A. Richard Caputo 
                               
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
May 17, 2012 
 
 
Before: SMITH and FISHER, Circuit Judges 
and STEARNS, District Judge∗
 
 
 
(Filed:  June 5, 2012) 
                              
 
                                                   
∗ The Honorable Richard G. Stearns, United States District Judge for the United 
States District Court of Massachusetts, sitting by designation. 
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_____________________ 
 
  OPINION 
_____________________                              
      
SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
 Richard Flower appeals from a grant of summary judgment holding him 
liable to his former employer, Colgate-Palmolive Company (“Colgate”), for a 
breach of fiduciary duty.  We will affirm.1
 Defendant Richard Flower was a 30-year employee of Plaintiff Colgate.  He 
retired in August 2006, pursuant to a voluntary early retirement plan.
 
2
                                                   
1 The District Court had diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  We have 
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We note that on September 28, 
2010, the Clerk identified a potential jurisdictional defect due to claims still 
pending against the Tandem Defendants.  The parties advised the Court that a 
settlement agreement was nearly finalized that would resolve the jurisdictional 
defect, and the Clerk referred the issue to the merits panel.  The District Court 
docket indicates that an agreement was reached, with the District Court entering 
judgment against Tandem on all remaining claims on January 4, 2011.  We 
therefore conclude that the jurisdictional defect has been resolved, and we have 
jurisdiction over this appeal. 
  Flower’s 
job involved marketing Colgate products.  Flower was responsible for ensuring 
that retailers stocked and prominently displayed Colgate products, for monitoring 
retailers’ inventory, and for encouraging retailers to restock Colgate products 
 
2 As appropriate on summary judgment, wherever there is a genuine dispute of 
material fact, we recite the facts in the light most favorable to Flower and draw all 
inferences in his favor.  See Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 127 (3d Cir. 
2001); Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 
1992). 
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through their normal suppliers when they ran low.  As part of Colgate’s effort to 
market its products, Flower was empowered to issue incentive payments through 
Colgate’s Total Account Management (“TAM”) system.  These payments were 
made to retailers to incentivize prompt restocking and prominent placement of 
Colgate products on retail shelves.  These payments were sometimes tied to 
specific wholesalers or distributors and, in those cases, were to be paid only to 
retailers buying product from those wholesalers or distributors. 
 Tandem Industries / Gyp’s Market (“Tandem”) is a store stocking Colgate 
products.  Starting in 1996, Flower entered into two arrangements with Tandem.  
First, Tandem agreed to take second-hand Colgate products (items returned by 
other retailers, left over from trade shows, etc.), sort through them, and sell those 
they could.  (A72-73)  Flower claims this was product that Colgate refused to take 
back, and that he was told to dispose of it however he could.  (A1341-42)  Flower 
viewed it as his property.  (A1342)  Flower acknowledges that he sold “his” 
product to Tandem at full price (list price minus any Colgate promotions), with the 
proceeds going to Flower, not Colgate.  (A1344-45)  In total, Tandem paid Flower 
approximately $25,000 over ten years. 
 At the same time, Tandem was receiving regular payments from Colgate in 
the form of checks authorized by Flower through the TAM system.  These 
payments totaled $674,070.55.  Colgate avers that these checks were drawn on 
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accounts earmarked as incentive payments for retailers purchasing products from 
specific large distributors, namely AmerisourceBergen (“Amerisource”) and Weis, 
and that Tandem never purchased from these distributors.  Tandem likewise admits 
that it never purchased from these distributors.  Flower admits that paying Tandem 
from these accounts would have been improper had he known Tandem was 
obtaining its products from other distributors.  (A1355, A1369-71)  But Flower 
says that he verified Tandem was stocking Colgate products by regularly checking 
Tandem’s inventory.  (A1316-17, A1320-21, A1349, A1359)  He also claims that 
he saw products in Tandem’s inventory that were exclusively available from 
Amerisource.  (A1319-20)  He suggests that further confirmation of the products’ 
precise origin would have been impossible because retailers and distributors treat 
this information as confidential.  (A1320, A1370)  Flower admits that he never 
asked Tandem where it was sourcing its products (A1349), even though he asked 
other retailers for similar information (A1331). 
 Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).3
                                                   
3 Rule 56 has since been revised, effective December 1, 2010.  Judgment was 
entered against Richard Flower on the fiduciary duty count on April 9, 2009, at 
which time this language was still in effect. 
  An issue of 
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material fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return 
a verdict for the nonmoving party.  See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 
242, 257 (1986).  “We exercise plenary review over a District Court’s grant of 
summary judgment[.]”  Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 130 n.6 (3d Cir. 
2001). 
 Colgate has brought a breach of fiduciary duty claim against Flower.  Under 
Pennsylvania law, employees owe a fiduciary duty to their employers.  See, e.g., 
Reading Radio, Inc. v. Fink, 833 A.2d 199, 211 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003).  Flower 
disclaims a fiduciary duty to Colgate, but because the duty is inherent to the 
employer-employee relationship, it is not something he can merely reject.   To hold 
Flower liable for a breach of fiduciary duty, it must be found that:  (1) Flower 
negligently or intentionally failed to act in good faith and solely for the benefit of 
Colgate in all matters for which he was employed; (2) that Colgate suffered injury; 
(3) that Flower’s failure to act solely for Colgate’s benefit was a real factor in 
bringing about Colgate’s injuries.  See Pa. Suggested Standard Civil Jury 
Instructions § 6.210 (2011). 
A fiduciary duty includes both a duty of loyalty – conducting the employer’s 
business in the employer’s best interest instead of one’s own – and a duty of care – 
conducting the employer’s business attentively and responsibly.  See Sylvester v. 
Beck, 178 A.2d 755, 757 (Pa. 1962) (“There can be no doubt that an agent owes a 
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duty of loyalty to his principal and in all matters, affecting the subject of his 
agency, he must act with the utmost good faith in the furtherance and advancement 
of the interests of his principal.”); Garbish v. Malvern Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 517 
A.2d 547, 554 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (“Because the relationship between the parties 
in this case was an agency relationship, appellant owed appellees a fiduciary duty 
and its conduct must be measured against the standard of care owed by a 
fiduciary.”); Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.01 cmt. g (“As agents, all 
employees owe duties of loyalty to their employers.”). 
 Regarding Flower’s sale of second-hand Colgate product to Tandem, there 
can be no question that Flower breached his fiduciary duty to Colgate.  
Misappropriating business which belongs to one’s employer is a clear breach of the 
duty of loyalty.  See Borden v. Sinskey, 530 F.2d 478, 489-90 (3d Cir. 1976) 
(explaining that usurping a corporate business opportunity is a violation of 
fiduciary duty).  Flower sold Colgate product to Tandem for his own profit, 
thereby misappropriating business from his employer, failing to act in good faith, 
and breaching his fiduciary duty. 
It is immaterial that Flower considered the product to be his own.  Even 
assuming Flower was free to keep, use, and potentially give away the product in 
his possession, he was not free to sell it to Tandem.  Those sales took the place of 
potential business that could have been done by Colgate.  It is likewise immaterial 
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that these were second-hand products.  In theory, second-hand goods could be 
considered a materially different product, such that Flower was not 
misappropriating business from Colgate.  But no reasonable jury could find that to 
be the case here, because Flower sold these supposed leftovers to Tandem for full 
price (list price minus applicable promotions).  (A1344-45) 
Flower contends that his supervisors at Colgate were aware that he was 
selling these leftover products.  We need not credit this contention, even on 
summary judgment.  In Flower’s July 2008 deposition, he made clear that he never 
discussed his dealings with Tandem with anyone at Colgate.  (A1345)  It is only in 
a September 2008 affidavit that Flower attempts to walk back these statements.  
(A248)  But he offers no explanation for the contradiction between his deposition 
and his subsequent affidavit.  The sham affidavit doctrine permits us to disregard 
his affidavit.  See Jiminez v. All Am. Rathskeller, Inc., 503 F.3d 247, 253 (3d Cir. 
2007). 
Flower likewise breached his fiduciary duty in disbursing over $670,000 in 
Colgate incentive funds to Tandem.  It is undisputed that these funds were intended 
only for retailers buying from particular distributors, and that Tandem did not 
purchase products from those distributors.  Flower testified at length about the 
purpose of incentive payments and these accounts in particular.  (A1317, A1352, 
A1354-56, A1369-71)  He acknowledged that payments from them were intended 
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only for retailers sourcing products from particular distributors.  (A1369-71)  
While Flower gave some details about how he verified the quantity of Colgate 
products stocked and sold by Tandem, he supplied virtually no information about 
how he verified the suppliers.  The only evidence Flower gave to support his 
apparent belief that Tandem was buying from those distributors was his claim that 
Tandem carried some products exclusively distributed by Amerisource.  (A1319-
20, A1371)  Flower provides no evidence at all to support a belief that Tandem 
was buying from Weis.   
Flower testified that no one from Tandem told him that Tandem bought 
products from Amerisource or Weis.  (A1371)  He never demanded paperwork 
from Tandem to substantiate the incentive payments.  He makes no claim that he 
recorded serial numbers or other information that could be used to track the 
products back to their distributors.  He admits that he never even asked where 
Tandem was buying its products (A1349), despite asking other stores for similar 
information.  (A1331)  No reasonable jury could find that Flower was not – at a 
minimum – negligent in failing to take these basic steps to safeguard Colgate’s 
interests.  Flower failed to exercise due care in issuing checks to Tandem, failed to 
act in good faith, and breached his fiduciary duty to Colgate. 
Flower offers a number of defenses.  First, Flower claims that he was never 
trained in use of the TAM system.  But never once during his extensive deposition 
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testimony does he claim that he issued the checks inadvertently, issued them from 
the wrong account, or otherwise made any technical mistake that would bear on 
our conclusion that he breached his duty of care. 
Second, Flower claims that as account manager for Amerisource and Weis, 
he was often asked by employees in other states to issue checks through TAM for 
those accounts without verifying supplier information.  (A1323)  But even 
assuming his actions were proper in those situations (an issue we do not decide), 
they were clearly improper here.  Flower directly interacted with Tandem’s 
principals, issued to them over $670,000 in Colgate funds, and never once made 
any effort to confirm that those disbursements were appropriate. 
Third, Flower claims that there was a practice at Colgate of issuing improper 
payments through the TAM system.  His brief points to no record evidence 
supporting this assertion, merely citing vague statements from Flower’s Answer to 
Colgate’s Complaint.  At deposition, Flower testified at length about how funds 
were earmarked for retailers buying from specific distributors, why that was 
important to business, and how the payments to Tandem would be improper if 
Tandem had not purchased from those distributors.  (A1352, A1354-56, A1369-71)  
In light of this evidence and Flower’s failure to substantiate his claims to the 
contrary, we need not credit those claims. 
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Fourth, Flower claims that neither retailers nor distributors would divulge 
with whom they were doing business, and so he could not ascertain the identity of 
suppliers.  (A1320, A1370)  Flower’s assertion is belied by deposition testimony 
from one of Tandem’s principals, indicating that Flower’s predecessor required 
documentation for incentive payments.  (A585-88)  But we need not rely on that 
testimony.  Even assuming Flower’s assertion is true, Flower did not even ask 
Tandem about its distributors.  (A1349)  Flower admits that he asked other stores 
about their major suppliers.  (A1331)  He has provided no explanation for why he 
could not ask Tandem the same thing.  Perhaps Tandem would have refused to 
divulge the information.  But Flower’s duty to his employer demanded no less. 
Finally, Flower claims that files that had been kept on his employee laptop 
would exonerate him and insists that we should apply an adverse inference for 
Colgate’s failure to produce the laptop and its files.  The undisputed evidence 
shows that Colgate destroyed the data on the laptop shortly after Flower’s 
retirement.  When data is destroyed pursuant to normal recordkeeping practices 
(and in particular when it is destroyed in relation to a major event like an 
employee’s retirement), no adverse inference is warranted.   
We therefore conclude that the District Court correctly granted summary 
judgment against Richard Flower for breach of fiduciary duty.  We will affirm. 
